
For decades, investors, economists, and policymakers have relied on familiar inflation gauges such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) Price Index to help determine the direction of monetary policy. While neither measure is perfect, both have served as the common language through which inflation has been discussed, debated, and ultimately confronted.
Now, Federal Reserve Chairman Kevin Warsh appears ready to change the conversation.
During his April confirmation proceedings, Warsh argued that policymakers should place greater emphasis on “trimmed mean” inflation measures indexes that remove the largest monthly price increases and declines before calculating the overall inflation rate. The goal is to strip away temporary distortions caused by energy shocks, supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical conflicts, weather events, and other short-term anomalies in order to reveal the economy’s underlying inflation trend.
From a theoretical standpoint, the argument has merit. Monetary policy operates with long and variable lags, making it poorly suited to react to every temporary spike in gasoline prices or every disruption in global shipping lanes. Central bankers are supposed to focus on persistent inflationary pressures, not every headline that flashes across a financial news terminal.
Yet economic theory often becomes more complicated when it encounters reality.
The central question is deceptively simple: When does a temporary shock stop being temporary?
If gasoline prices surge for a month, most economists would agree that the increase represents an outlier. But what if prices remain elevated for three months? Six months? A year? At what point does a statistical anomaly become an economic trend? More importantly, when does a cost repeatedly paid by consumers become too economically significant to be dismissed as noise?
That question is arriving at a politically sensitive moment.
Just weeks ago, President Trump publicly expressed confidence in Warsh’s judgment regarding the future path of interest rates. Since then, however, the White House has become increasingly vocal in its desire for lower borrowing costs. The coincidence is difficult to ignore. If policymakers place greater emphasis on inflation measures that exclude the most extreme price movements, inflation may appear more subdued than traditional headline measures suggest. And if inflation appears lower, the justification for cutting interest rates becomes easier to make.
To be clear, trimmed-mean inflation is not a statistical gimmick. Economists have studied and utilized such measures for decades. Supporters argue that they provide a cleaner signal, helping policymakers avoid overreacting to temporary volatility.
Critics counter with a straightforward observation: households do not live in a trimmed-mean economy.
Families pay actual prices for groceries, gasoline, insurance, rent, and utilities. They experience inflation in real time, not after economists remove the inconvenient data points. If elevated costs persist long enough to alter household budgets and consumer behavior, excluding those costs may improve statistical precision while diminishing public credibility.
But perhaps the most important question is not whether consumers will accept the new measure. It is whether Wall Street will.
Financial markets ultimately determine long-term borrowing costs. The Federal Reserve directly controls overnight interest rates, but mortgage rates, corporate borrowing costs, and Treasury yields are heavily influenced by bond investors’ expectations for future inflation.
If investors conclude that inflation is genuinely falling, lower short-term rates could translate into lower long-term rates. But if markets view a shift toward trimmed-mean inflation as an attempt to redefine inflation rather than defeat it, the result could be exactly the opposite. Bond investors may demand higher yields to compensate for perceived inflation risk, pushing long-term Treasury rates and mortgage rates higher even as the Federal Reserve cuts short-term rates.
In other words, the policy could backfire.
Economics has always depended on confidence. Inflation measures work because people trust them. Monetary policy works because markets believe it. The Federal Reserve is certainly free to change the “ruler” it uses to measure inflation.
The question is whether investors will accept the new measurements or decide that the “ruler” itself has become part of the problem.
DC Aiken is Senior Vice President of Lending for CrossCountry Mortgage, NMLS # 658790. For more insights, you can subscribe to his newsletter at dcaiken.com.
The opinions expressed within this article may not reflect the opinions or views of CrossCountry Mortgage, LLC or its affiliates.